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THE SILENCE OF THE LAWS*
During the last few months I have heard quite a few-lawyers as
well as laymen-whisper that, in the course of our preparation for this
great war, measures have been taken and are under consideration which
are subversive of the Constitution.
On the other hand, we have the spectacle of Governors, Senators
and many others, who glibly prate of dictatorships, and the silence of
the laws in the midst of arms.
Under these circumstances, it has seemed to me necessary for us
to consider how far we have a Constitution for time of war, as well
as for time of peace; and to what extent, if at all, any of the provisions
of our great Charter are eclipsed or superseded by the necessities of
the last recourse of kings and sovereign peoples.
In indicating the question, I can do no better than call upon two
great men, belonging to past history, to state their apparently opposite
convictions,
The first is John Quincy Adams, "the stormy petrel of American
politics." In a debate in the Senate, in 1836, he expressed himself as
follows:
"Sir, in the authority given to Congress by the Constitution, to
declare war, all the powers incidental to war are, by necessary implica-
tion, conferred upon the Government of the United States. Now the
powers incidental to war are derived, not from any internal municipal
source, but from the laws and usages of nations.
"There are then, Mr. Chairman, in the authority of Congress and
the Executive, two classes of powers, altogether different in nature and
Thl paper was read by Mr. Charles P. WilHams. of the St. Louis Bar, before
the Washington University Association on February 26, 1918.-Ed.
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often incompatible.with each other-the- war power and the peace
power. The peace power is limited by regulations and restricted by
provisions prescribed within the Constitution itself. The war power is
limited only by the laws and the usages of nations. This power is
tremendous; it is strictly constitutional, but it breaks down every bar-
rier so anxiously. erected for the protection of liberty, of property and
of life."
Against this, I call Justice Davis, speaking for the majority of a
tribunal which has been called the most powerful and majestic on this
earth. His language has been criticised as unnecessary to the decision
of the case; but it is an eloquent expression of the view contrary to
that enunciated by Mr. Adams.
"The Constitution of the United States," he said, "is a law for
rulers and people, equally in war and peace, and covers with the shield
of its protection all classes of men at all times and under all circum-
stances. No doctrine involving more pernicious consequences was
ever invented by the wit of man than that any of its provisions can be
suspended during any of the great exigencies of government. Such a
doctrine leads directly to anarchy or despotism, but the theory of neces-
sity, upon which it is based, is false; for the Government, within the
Constitution, has all the powers granted to it which are necessary to
preserve its existence as has been happily proved by the result of the
great effort to throw off its just authority. * * * * * This nation, as
experience has proved, cannot always remain at peace, and has no right
to expect that it will always have wise and humane rulers sincerely
attached to the principles of the Constitution. Wicked men, ambitious
of power, may fill the place once occupied by Washington and Lincoln
and if this right is conceded, and the calamities of war again befall
us, the dangers to human liberty are frightful to contemplate. If our
fathers had failed to provide for just such a contingency, they would
have been false to the trust reposed in them. They knew-the history
of the world told them-the nation they were founding, be its exist-
ence short or long, would be involved in war; how often or how long
continued, human foresight could not tell; and that unlimited power,
wherever lodged at such a time, was especially hazardous to free men.
For this, and other equally weighty reasons, they secured the inherit-
ance they had fought to maintain by incorporating in a written Con-
stitution the safeguards which time had proved were essential to its
preservation. Not one of these safeguards can the President or Con-
gress or the Judiciary disturb, except the one concerning the writ of
habeas corpus." (Ex parte, Milligan, 4 Wall. 1.)
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Addressing ourselves to the Constitution, we have six express
powers to Congress, usually designated as war powers:
"To declare war, grant letters of morgue and reprisal, and make
rules concerning captures on land and water."
"To raise and support armies, but no appropriation of money to
that use shall be for a longer term than two years."
"To provide and maintain a navy."
"To make rules for the government and regulation of the land
and naval forces."
"To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of
the Union, suppress insurrections and repel invasions."
"To provide for organizing, arming and disciplining the militia
and for governing such part of them as may be employed in the service
of the United States, reserving to the States respectively the appoint-
ment of the officers, and the authority of training the militia according
to the discipline prescribed by Congress." (Art. 1, Sec. 8.)
The executive powers vested in the President are the following:
"The President shall be Commander-in-Chief of the army and
navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States when
called into the actual service of the United States * * ** *" (Art. 2,
Sec. 2.)
"He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed." (Art. 2,
Sec. 3.)
It is further provided that
"The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union
a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them
against invasion and, on application of the legislature, or of the Execu-
tive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic vio-
lence." (Art. 4, Sec. 4.)
The power to declare war has been held to involve the power in
Congress "to prosecute it by all means and in any manner in which
war may be legitimately prosecuted." (Miller vs. U. S., 11 Wall. 1. c.
305,)
It was certainly not contemplated that, after issuing a declaration
of war, we should fold our hands in utter passivity, and do nothing
toward vindicating the purposes for which that declaration was made.
The power to make war was vested in terms exclusively in the
original confederation. The Constitution expressly' prohibited to any
State the right to enter into any treaty, alliance or confederation; the.
right to grant letters of marque and reprisal; the right, without the
consent of Congress, to keep troops or ships of war in time of peace;
the right to enter into any agreement or compact with a foreign power;
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and the right to engage in war, unless actually invaded or in such immi-
nent danger as would not admit of delay.
Outside of cases where a State is actually invaded, or is in immi-
nent danger thereof, I think it may be fairly said that the whole power
of declaring and prosecuting war is vested as completely in the Federal
Government as if there were no States whatsoever and the Federal
Government stood alone. (Cf. Insurance Co. vs. Carter, 1 Peters,
1. c. 542; Prize Cases, 2 Black 1. c. 668.)
It was certainly never intended by the framers of the Constitu-
tion that in such a supreme crisis as a war threatening the existence of
the country, the Federal Government should ever be put, directly or
indirectly, into the position of appealing for assistance to the individual
States and of endeavoring to induce them to pass any measure which
might be necessary to the successful conduct of that war. To impute
any such intention to the framers of the Constitution, after their experi-
ence with the individual States during the war of the Revolution, is to
impute" to them a degree of blindness and folly which they do not
deserve. In the sam,- way the power to raise and support armies as
distinguished from a mere state militia, is a power vested so com-
pletely in the United States, as to be beyond state control or inter-
ference. (Tarble's Case, 13 Wall. 397.)
Now the measures that may be required to successfully prose-
cute a great war to a successful conclusion; the measures necessary
to raise and support vast armies, and keep them supplied with sub-
sistence, munitions and equipment, are certainly not easy of precise
limitation or definition. No such definition or limitation was under-
taken to be imposed upon these powers by the framers of the Consti-
tution.
They realized and realized shrewdly that it was impossible to
calculate the degree of danger to which the nation might be exposed,
and they were conscious that the feeling of nationality, under the spur
of apparent necessity, would override any quantitative limitation upon
the extent of such powers.
This is perfectly manifest from the expressions of both Hamil-
ton and Madison in the Federalist. Hamilton expresses himself
strongly upon this point in the Twenty-third Number; and Madison
is even more emphatic in the Fortieth Number.
These expressions have been seized upon to demonstrate that the
war-power was understood by the writers to override the rest of the
Constitution. It may be observed that the language was employed
when there were no amendments; and to my mind there is no fair
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suggestion therein that this power of defence was understood as de-
stroying any of the other provisions or limitations in the Constitution.
No one doubts that the grant of a power involves in itself the right
to make use of the necessary means for the exercise of that power;
but out of excessive caution, the Constitution expressly conferred
power upon Congress to make all laws which should be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all other
powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United
States or any department or officer thereof.
The meaning of "necessary and proper" has been settled for a
great many years. It was settled by the decision of Chief Justice
Marshall one hundred years ago in the great case of McCulloch
v. Maryland. (4 Wheat, 316.)
The test there laid down was, in short, as follows:
"Let the end be legitimate; let it be within the scope of the Con-
stitution; and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the
letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional." (I. c. 421.)
As a matter of fact, I think we would be justified, under existing
decisions, in stating the rule even more strongly than it was stated
there; and in saying that, inasmuch as every law enacted by a co-
ordinate branch of the Government is presumed to be valid and con-
stitutional, in order to condemn any particular means chosen to exe-
cute a plain power, the Courts must be able to say, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the law is plainly not adapted or calculated to
the execution of the particular power. This same doctrine must apply
to the power to declare and carry on war and to raise and support
armies,
Unless, therefore, we can say, that a particular law professedly
passed in the execution of the war power or the power to raise and
support armies, is plainly not adapted, in reasonably direct degree, to
support our armies or to carry on the war to a successful conclusion,
then that particular law must be regarded as valid and within the
legislative powers of Congress; unless, at least, its passage be pro-
hibited to the legislature by some applicable provision of the Constitu-
tion. To say, therefore, in any event, as has sometimes been done,
that the powers of Congress remain quite the same for time of war
as for time of peace, is saying something that cannot be true; because
the war power is incident to a state of war and springs into effective-
ness only upon the occurrence of war; although it is conceivable that
Congress might enact, in times of peace, a code of laws which would
become effective only during time of war.
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW.
It certainly can make no difference that such laws, passed in the
exercise of the war power, bite deeply into what was, during times of
peace, the exclusive province of the States. The Constitution and the
laws passed in pursuance thereof are the supreme law of the land, and
in the exercise of its rightful powers, the United States is unqualifiedly
a sovereign.
While some of his language goes beyond my conclusion, I cannot
refrain from quoting the language of an Australian judge, who was
dealing with a Constitution quite similar to our own:
"The problem of national defense is not confined to operations
on the battlefield, or the deck .of a man-of-war; its factors enter into
every phase of life, and embrace the co-operation of every individual
with all that he possesses-his property, his energy, his life itself; and
in this supreme crisis we can no more sever the requirements and
efforts of the civil population, whose liberties and possessions are at
stake, from the movements of our soldiers and sailors who are defend-
ing then, than we can cut away the roots of a living tree and bid it
live and bear fruit." Farey v. Burvett, 21 Commonwealth Law Re-
ports 453.)
These are strong words; and, so far as any question of state right
or state power is concerned, they are equally applicable to our own
situation.
We have a striking illustration of federal control over the state
in the cases arising under the limitation law passed by Congress in
1864. That law provided that "wherever, during the existence of the
present rebellion, any action, civil or criminal, shall accrue against
any person who, by reason of resistance to the execution of the laws of
the United States or the interruption of the ordinary course of judicial
proceedings, cannot be served with process for the commencement of
such action or for the arrest of such person; or wherever after such
action, civil or criminal, shall have accrued, such person cannot, by
reason of such resistance to the laws or such interruption of judicial
proceedings, be arrested or served with process, the time during which
such persons shall be beyond the reach of legal process shall not be
deemed or taken as any part of the time limited by law for the com-
mencement of such action."
It was held by the Supreme Court that this statute was retrospec-
tive as well as prospective; that it controlled and overrode state stat-
utes of limitation and governed state courts; and that, so construed, it
was plainly constitutional. The power to pass the act was declared to
be necessarily implied from the power to make war and suppress
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insurrections. (Stewart vs. Kahn, 11 Wall., 493; U. S. vs. Wily, 11
Wall. 508; Mayfield vs. Richards, 115 U. S. 137.)
It will further be recalled that during the Civil War, at a time
when the financial fortunes of the Union were at their lowest ebb, the
Government resorted to the use of paper money which was made a
legal tender for debts. This paper money was worth very much less
than the corresponding denomination in specie. Nevertheless, in what
are known as the Legal Tender Cases, the Suprem6 Court upheld the
law as valid even when applied to contracts made before the passage
of the law.
The indirect result was to enable debtors to pay their debts in
depreciated currency and, to that extent, to defeat creditors of their
just claims and to impair the obligation of their contracts. Yet the
Courts sustained the law; and the majority opinion is put squarely upon
the ground that it was an appropriate means for the successful prose-
cution of the war. (Legel Tender Cases, 12 Wallace, 457.)
In the same fashion, the Supreme Court has very recently over-
ruled the argument that unlimited conscription cannot be within the
power of Congress because its effect would be to destroy the militia
of the state.
The Supreme Court of Indiana once declared that "when Con-
gress has declared war, by that declaration, it puts into effect the laws
of war, and the wai-powers of the government, which cannot be exer-
cised under the Constitution, in time of peace, now come into full
force by virtue of the Constitution, and are to be exerted by the Presi-
dent and Congress. * * * * Every measure of Congress and
every executive act performed by the President, intended and calcu-
lated to carry the war to a successful conclusion, are acts done under
the Constitution; * * * * and the validity of such acts must be
determined by the Constitution." (McCormack vs. Humphry, 27
Ind. 1. c. 154.)
It is manifest, at any rate, that the power thus vested in Congress
is of tremendous, almost incalculable, extent; and the burden rests
heavily upon him who, from any motive whatsoever, undertakes to
resist the execution of laws professing to be enacted under that power.
This is peculiarly true because of the delicacy of the subject mat-
ter. A court naturally shrinks and hesitates, upon occasions which
may involve the existence of the nation, from reversing measures
which have been undertaken by the departments of the Government
charged with its preservation. Courts, after all, are in the last analysis
a sort of representative bodies.
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It is, however, plainly the duty of the Court to annul the attempted
exercise of any power which is contrary to the Constitution, which is
the supreme law and which the Court is sworn and commissioned to
uphold and maintain; no matter how great may be the popular interest
or clamor.
Nevertheless, there is a considerable tendency manifested at the
present time to maintain that the war-power is precisely what John
Quincy Adams declared it to be; and that it becomes, for the time, the
pivot-practically the sole content-of the Constitution. To some
extent this is the work of the demagogue, whom democracies always,
have with them; but similar expressions are being used by some men
to whom the people have a right to look for wise leadership.
So far as it has any intelligible basis or argument among intelli-
gent men, this position seems to be founded on two propositions.
These propositions are: First, every nation has, like every indi-
vidual, the absolute and inherent right of self-preservation: second,
necessity knows no law; and a war for its existence is the supreme
necessity of a nation.
Taking up, in the first place, the theory of self-preservation: It
argues that the national Government is expressly designed to be eter-
nal; that it was intended to be, in all its necessities, absolutely inde-
pendent of the states; that there results, or must be implied, from the
formation of such a government, a supreme power of self-preserva-
tion which not only overrides, under the plea of necessity, all the
negations of the Constitution, but is independent of any specific grants
of power.
The fullest and most careful statement of the principle is laid
down by Wheaton in the following language:
"Of the absolute international rights of states, one of the most
essential and important and that which lies at the foundation of all the
rest, is the right of self-preservation. It is not only a right with
respect to other states, but a duty with respect to its own members,
and the most solemn and important which the state owes to them. This
right necessarily involves all other incidental rights to give effect to
the principal end." (Wheat. Int. Law, 8th Am. Ed., Sec. 61.)
There is certain language in the majority opinion in the Legal
Tender Cases which may be said to lean in this direction and the
opinion of Justice Bradley, after pointing out that the federal govern-
ment is the only one in this country, having the characteristics of
nationality, vested with the sole power of war and peace and the
regulation of our foreign affairs, proceeds to assert:
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"Such being the character of the general government, it seems
to be a self-evident proposition that it is vested with all those inherent
and implied powers which, at the time of adopting the Constitution,
'ere generally considered as belonging to every government as such
and as being essential to its functions."
So far as I can ascertain, however, the Supreme Court has never
squarely rested any decision upon the right of self-preservation as a
substantive source of power. Strong objections have been urged
against the application of any such principle to our federal government.
It is said that such a principle is based upon the law of nature as
applied to nations. It postulates a complete sovereignty, and has refer-
ence to its rights as against other sovereignties. Furthermore, if we
use the term state as meaning a particular government or governmental
establishment, and the statement as having reference to its relations
with its own citizens, the principle is predicable of the harshest
despotism and can be made the justification for every act of arbitrary
power professing to protect and preserve the existing establishment
as against any danger, external or internal, real or apparent. Fur-
thermore, it is objected that such a principle ignores the distinction
between an absolute sovereignty and a qualified sovereignty that exer-
cises delegated powers; that if anything can be settled by repeated
judicial iteration, it is settled and established by the language of
Marshall and Story and practically all their successors, that this gov-
ernment is one of delegated, limited and enumerated powers and that
it can claim no powers of any sort not granted to it in the Constitution,
either expressly or by necessary implication.
It is further objected on the ground that a supreme power of self-
preservation, which overrides all negations and is independent of any
and all specific grants of power, ignores utterly the theory which
excepts certain things out of the rightful power of government; that
it destroys the essential character (as generally understood) of that
government which it is invented to preserve. Who, it is asked, is to
be the judge of the occasion when this dormant and irresistable power
of self-preservation shall be called into active exertion? Is it to be
the Executive, the Legislature, or the judiciary? Why one rather
than the other? If its invocation is to be discretionary, who shall
revise and correct that discretion? On the other hand, the advocates
of the theory assert that the power is vested in Congress, but that
being in its nature a resulting or implied power, it cannot be a specific
power; and that we are long since committed to the doctrine of result-,
ing or implied powers; that such a power to preserve itself in great
crises vests in every organized society; and that it belongs, under our
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system, to the Legislature, in whose hands it may be safely reposed
until the spirit of liberty has fled from our people forever.
Now with all deference to those who assert it, I feel bound to
reject this principle of self-preservation as applied to the United
States. It was undoubtedly intended by our political fathers to vest
this nation, by the grants in the Constitution, with all the powers
they deemed essential to its preservation. If unlimited power in war
be essential, why not derive it from the power to make war? If
transcendent force be occasionally requisite to preserve organized so-
ciety from internal anarchy, why not derive it from the power to exe-
cute the laws and to suppress insurrection? What do we gain by
resorting to the supreme power of self-preservation? If it be impliedly
contained in the Constitution, is it not as subject to the negations of
that instrument as if it had been an express power? If it be an extra-
constitutional power and so unlimited by the Constitution, what be-
comes of the theory of a limited delegation and the reservation to the
states and to the people?
We come then to the theory of the war power-the power of de-
fense-as being, on the ground of necessity, unlimited by any of the
prohibitions of the Constitution.
Let it be understood that we are speaking here, as elsewhere, of
the power to make war, in its internal, not in its external aspect. I
am willing to admit, that as against enemies, the power to make war is
absolutely unlimited, except so far as it may be limited by the plainest
principles of the law of nations. It has even been held by the Supreme
Court that the law of nations may be modified as against enemies by
peculiar conditions. (Miller vs. U. S., 11 Wallace 268.)
I am willing to admit further that the war power may be un-
limited, except as just stated, against enemy subjects, even though they
be within the boundaries of our own country. There would seem too
little doubt that a law may be passed providing for the absolute con-
fiscation of all the property of enemies and enemy subjects, so far as
such property is subject to our jurisdiction. (Brown vs. U. S., 8
Cranch 110; Miller vs. U. S., 11 Wallace 268.)
I adnit further that in accordance with the general rules of inter-
national law, on grounds of prudence and necessity, enemy subjects
may be segregated or interned; and such a law was enacted as early
as 1798 in this country, and, to some extent, enforced in the war of
1812.
I am speaking here rather of the internal aspect of the war power
-- its relationship toward the lives, the liberty and property of our
own citizens. May it.be an unlimited power as to them?
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol3/iss2/1
THE SILENCE OF THE LAWS.
The proponents of such a power assert, in the first place, that we
recognize in the state governments the existence of the police power,
which is the supreme and reserved power of the state to guard the
health, safety, peace and morals of the community; that the police
power, to the extent to which its existence is recognized, is understood
to be an exception to and operates, within its fair limits, in spite of,
general constitutional restraints: that while the United States has no
police power as such, yet it may exercise its granted powers for police
ends Thus it may employ the power to regulate commerce to abso-
lutely prohibit certain kinds of commerce. That the war power not
only embraces a vast and undefined police power, but is in itself a
supreme species of police power; and as such may and must, within
the fair limits of necessity, override constitutional restraints upon the
ordinary power of Government.
In the second place, they say, it is admitted that the degree of
national force and energy to be directed against an enemy is unlimited;
it is such as the occasion may demand. Therefore, the greater must
include the less; there must reside in the government, charged with the
duty of defense, the incidental power to mass and bring to bear every
internal resource against the external enemy and without any restric-
tions or limitations at all. It is another instance of the sort manifested
by the cases dealing with interstate commerce where the Supreme
Court has recognized a power in the federal government, and its
agencies, to deal with and regulate intrastate commerce, so far as
necessary to the full and complete regulation of interstate commerce.
They say further than conscription was practiced by the Colonies
during the war for independence; during the Civil War, by both sides;
that its exercise in this war, to any extent within the discretion of
Congress, has just been sanctioned, and correctly sanctioned by the
Supreme Court; that every person in this country may be called, at
the will of Congress, to the colors, to make the supreme sacrifice of
his life for his country; that there is no constitutional provision that
inhibits the impairment of the obligation of contracts by the federal
government in the exercise of a power granted to it; that no contract
could be made in advance which could in any wise hamper or limit
such powers; that neither conscription into the army would violate
nor was ever intended to be restrained by any of the personal guar-
antees in the Constitution; and that the right to so command one's life
and liberty for the direct prosecution of the war, is sufficient to demon-
strate an intention that property and all lesser rights should be
equally included. In all these respects, they say, the extent of the
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power to be actually exercised is, and can be, measured only by exist-
ing necessity; and that of that necessity, Congress is the final judge.
The proponents of this supreme quality in the war power go fur-
ther and assert that the law of necessity is not only well known to the
common law with respect to public and private rights, but that it has
a recognized operation in relation to war and military affairs; that war
is the mortal disease of nations, and is the supreme necessity of na-
tional life; and in this connection they lay especial stress upon what is
called martial law. This insistence is a source of considerable con-
fusion to most persons.
Martial law is not the same thing as military law, although for-
merly confounded with it. Military law means that body of rules and
regulations which governs the soldier as a soldier. It is, so to speak,
the municipal law of the army and its component elements regarded
as an independent community. For a long time there has been recog-
nized, upon the express ground of necessity, a right in the commander
of an army to deal in drastic and executive fashion with the short-
comings of his soldiers, entirely independent of the general civil au-
thorities, especially in time of war. This was so in Europe much
earlier than in England. In the latter country, it gradually became
the practice for the King, with the consent of his council, to issue sets
of rules to govern the conduct of his troops in time of war. Most,
if not all, of these troops would be civilians called to the colors. In
1642, during a time of civil war, the commander of the parliamentary
arny promulgated for the first time, with the sanction of parliament,
a military code of ninety-six articles for the government of his soldiers.
The English military law assumed a regular statutory form in 1689;
subject to the right of the King (and his commanders) as Commander-
in-Chief to make consistent and supplemental regulations. The Amer-
icans became familiar with this military code in the Colonial Wars.
The Second Continental Congress adopted articles of war largely com-
piled from the British regulations. These were amended in 1776 and
1786 and were expressly recognized by our first Congress. These
articles of war have been revised from time to time by Congress, but
the President, or his subordinate agencies, still have the right to issue
supplemental and administrative orders for army government.
Now military law, in the sense we are talking of, was plainly
contemplated and provided for by the Constitution; it was in mind
when Congress was granted power to make rules for the government
of the land and -naval forces. Nevertheless, it is asserted that it was
never intended that any of the provisions of our bill of rights should
in any wise affect or control this military law.
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This assertion is based upon the following observations: It is
expressly provided by the Fifth Amendment that the requirement of
indictment or presentment should not apply to soldiers and sailors, as
such; they are not entitled to trial by jury; the tribunals to which they
are subject are not courts, but mere agencies of the executive, and
their proceedings are never subject to review by the judiciary, save
for want of jurisdiction; the Supreme Court has expressly held that
for those in the military service, the military law is due process of
law; the provisions for taking depositions by either side, for use in
Courts Martial, show that the requirement of confrontation by wit-
nesses has no application; for a very long time the Articles of War
conferred no right of representation by counsel, although it was
usually permitted; the provision for reasonable bail was never intended
to release the soldier from the guard-house, pending trial; and it is
hard to believe that the soldier, as such, was in mind when the first
amendment prohibited Congress from passing any law abridging the
freedom of speech.
It is further pointed out that four judges of the Supreme Court,
in the case of Milligan, (4 Wall. 1), declared the power of Congress,
in the government of the land and naval forces, was not at all affected
by the Fifth or any other Amendment; and that this statement was
not in terms controverted by the majority judges, nor is it opposed
by any other actual decision.
Therefore, the proponents of the unlimited scope of the war
power assert that here is one phase of that power which was plainly
never intended to be controlled by all the provisions of the Constitu-
tion; but upon the ground of necessity was to stand independent
thereof.
These advocates of the unrestricted scope of the war power bear
down still more strongly upon military government. Military govern-
ment, in the proper sense, differs in two important respects from mili-
tary law. Military law governs the soldier as such; at most, the indi-
vidual units that go to make up a completed army. Military govern-
ment reaches out and embraces civilians. Military law governs the
army at home and abroad. Military government is always erected
over territory captured from an enemy, or from those regarded as
enemies. Properly speaking there can be no such thing as military
government over domestic territory.
Military government finds its basis also in necessity-the neces-
sity of preserving the army and its lines of communication upon hos-
tile soil; and the necessity for some sort of government to replace the
overthrown authority of the enemy.
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Military government is thus incident to war; and is plainly
founded upon the power of the President as Commander-in-Chief and
the power to make war. The provisions of the Constitution guarantee-
ing certain civil rights have never been supposed to control military
government. The Supreme Court of the United States has expressed
itself very clearly on this proposition.
"Although the City of New Orleans was conquered and taken
possession of in a civil war waged * * * * * * * to restore
the supremacy of the national government * * * * * * *
that government had the same rights and power in the territory held
by conquest as if the territory had belonged to a foreign country and
had been subjugated in a foreign war. In such cases the conquering
power has a right to displace the pre-existing authority and to assume,
to such an extent as it may deem proper, the exercise by itself of all
the powers and functions of government. * * * It may do any-
thing necessary to strengthen itself or weaken the enemy. There is no
limit to the powers that may be executed in such cases, save those
which are found in the law and usages of war. * * * * * * *
In such cases the laws of war take the place of the Constitution and
laws of the United States as applied in times of peace." (New Or-
leans vs. Steamship Co., 20 Wallace 387.)
If these doctrines apply to the territory of states in insurrection,
regarded as that of a foreign enemy, a fortiori they apply to the terri-
tory of purely foreign states.
It thus appears that there exists under the United States, created
by the Constitution, a power of military government fundamentally
based on necessity to which the ordinary safe guards of the Constitu-
tion, as a source of municipal law, have absolutely no application.
Taking up martial law, by this term is meant the rule of the
military authorities over domestic territory or territory regarded
as domestic. It is a temporary supersession, in whole or in part, on
the ground of necessity, of the ordinary civil laws, by the rule and
sometimes by the tribunals erected by the military commander. It
applies to all the civil inhabitants of the territory subject to it.
If it has any existence in the United States as a federal power.
(and I have no doubt of such existence) it must be deduced from the
power to make war, the power to suppress insurrection, the power to
execute the laws or from the means clause in the Federal Constitution.
It may be conveniently regarded from two aspects; the aspect of the
war power and the aspect of the power to execute the laws of the
United States, although to some extent these run into each other.
Martial law was declared, for example, in St. Louis and its environs
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol3/iss2/1
THE SILENCE OF THE LAWS.
in 1861; in Baltimore in 1863 and in Kentucky in 1864. Regulations
were promulgated, military commissions erected and offenders tried.
In determining the rightfulness and extent of martial law, upon such
occasions, the proponents of an unlimited war power are confronted
with the case of Milligan decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States to which reference has heretofore been made. In that case a
Military Contmission, appointed by the commanding general in the
District of Indiana, acting as a military court, condemned to death
one Milligan, who was not a prisoner of war, had never been in the
military or naval service and had resided in the state and district
where the commission was held for upwards of twenty years. The
Supreme Court took judicial notice that in Indiana the federal au-
thority was always un-opposed; that its courts were always open and
their process unobstructed. It held that inasmuch as a federal statute
provided for the discharge of all such prisoners who were not indicted
within a limited time after their arrest, and Milligan had not been so
indicted, he must be discharged. The majority of the Court went
much further and held that the sentence of the Military Commission
was in direct violation of the Constitution; and that it made no dif-
ference that it was a time of war.
The majority of the Court resolved as follows: The laws of war
can never be applied to citizens in civil life in loyal states, where the
Courts are open and unobstructed. In such a case no necessity can
be urged which would prevent the trial of an offender by the federal
courts. Under such circumstances Milligan was deprived of his right
to be tried before a constitutional court and was denied the right of
trial by jury.
In the course of their opinion they used the language which has
heretofore been quoted.
There are, however, important concessions in the opinion of the
majority:
"It will be borne in mind that this is not a question," they say, "of
the power to proclaim martial law, when war exists in a community
and the courts and civil authorities are overthrown. Nor is it a ques-
tion what rule a military commander, at the head of his army, can
impose on states in rebellion to cripple their resources, and quell the
insurrection. * * * * * * * It is difficult to see how the
safety of the country required martial law in Indiana. If any of her
citizens were plotting treason, the power of arrest could secure them,
until the government was prepared for them and the courts were
open and ready to try them. Martial law cannot arise from a threat-
ened invasion. The necessity must be actual and present; the invasion
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real and such as effectually closes the courts and deposes the civil ad-
ministration. * * * * * * * It follows from what has been
said on this subject, that there are occasions when martial rule can
be properly applied. If, in foreign invasion or civil war, the courts
are actually closed, and it is impossible to administer criminal justice,
according to law, then, on the scene of active military operations,
where war actually prevails, there is a necessity to furnish a substi-
tute for the civil authority, thus overthrown, to preserve the safety
of the army and society, and as- no power is left but the military, it is
allowed to govern by martial rule, until the laws can have their free
course. As necessity creates the rule, so it limits its duration; for if
this government is continued after the courts are reinstated, it is a
gross usurpation of power."
The minority of the Court held that Congress indeed had no
power to apply the laws of war in time of peace; but there where
war existed, and some portions of the country were invaded, and all
were exposed to invasion, it was within the power of Congress to de-
termine what states or districts were the seat of such imminent public
danger as justified the authorization of military tribunals for the trial
of offenses against the safety of the army or the public; that it might
well happen that the courts were technically open, but utterly ineffec-
tive to the emergency; and that under such circumstances Congress,
under the power to declare war, and the power to raise and support
armies, might validly provide for military trials.
The minority of the court held further, that martial law is im-
pliedly recognized by and exists under the Constitution; that it may
be called into action by Congress, or, when there is sudden peril and
Congress cannot be invoked, by the President; and be made applicable
in times of insurrection or invasion, or in civil or foreign war, in
districts or localities where ordinary law no longer adequately secures
public safety and private rights.
The proponents of the power of Congress to provide for martial
law, point out that all the judges agreed that where necessity actually
exists, martial law may be properly resorted to.
But they gloss over, or fail to observe, that the essential holding
of the majority is, that whether or not there exists any possible occa-
sion for martial law is in itself a judicial question; and unless the cir-
cumstances indicated in the majority opinion are present, its proclama-
tion is illegal, because contrary to the Constitution.
They criticise, moreover, very strongly the majority holding. They
assert that to admit the rightful existence of martial law when the
enemy has crossed our boundary, but to deny its possible existence
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when he is approaching it, is weak and foolish; and that to limit its
existence to cases where the courts have actually ceased to sit is to
substitute shadow for substance; the real necessity arising when the
courts, for any reason, are unable to cope with a situation fraught with
immediate danger to the safety of army and public. In such a posi-
tion, they are powerfully supported by the English Privy Council, in
a case growing out of the South African war. (Ex parte Marais,
1902 (A. C.) 109.)
They say further, that whether martial law, total or qualified, is
a method necessary to the prosecution of war, under particular con-
ditions, is involved in the power to carry on the war, which is vested
in Congress; and that the decision of Congress, as to such necessity,
ought to be binding upon the courts, as being political in nature.
They declare, finally, that the minority opinion in Milligan's case
is now quite generally regarded by the better authorities, as being the
sounder law; although the case has never been overruled.
There are thus two phases of necessity: the general phase, and
the-phase having particularly to do with martial law.
Taking up the latter phase first, it seems to me to demand too
much.
I admit that there are many instances at common law, where
necessity may be relied upon by indi-viduals as a justification for con-
duct otherwise tortious; and to that extent, necessity is unquestion-
ably a part of the common law.
Thus a man might justify in time of war for making fortifica-
tion- on another's land. (1 Dyer, 36b.)
So he might dig for gravel to erect a fort. (12 Rep. 12.)
He might tear down houses for the defense of the realm. (4
T. R., I. c. 797.)
Buildings might he blown up to stop a conflagration. (1 Dyer,
36b; 12 Rep. 13. Bowditch vs. Boston, 101 U. S. 16.)
Provisions might be destroyed to prevent their falling into the
hands of the enemy. (Republica vs. Sparhawk, 1 Dallas 357.)
Goods necessary for the immediate exigencies of the army might
be seized. (Mitchell vs. Harmony, 13 How. I. c. 133; Wellman vs.
Dickerman, 44 Mo. 4F4.)
And many other instances might be cited.
Nevertheless, I understand the true rule in such cases to be that
an apparently reasonable necessity must have been present. Otherwise
it was trespass.
This is the rule laid down by the United States Supreme Court,
which held liable a military commander, for unreasonable seizure of
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property belonging to a citizen of the United States. (Mitchell vs.
Harmony, supra.)
This same rule, with respect to the person, is what I consider the
essential holding in the Milligan case.
In the absence of a statute, at least, every act committed against
the person or property of a citizen by a military commander or his
subordinates, may be re-examined by a court to ascertain whether
there was present a reasonable supposition of necessity, under all the
circumstances.
"It is an unbending rule of law, that the exercise of military
power, where the rights of citizens are concerned, shall never be
pushed beyond what the exigency requires." (Raymond vs. Thomas,
91 U. S. 712.)
The question whether that apparent exigency existed, in each and
every individual case. is'a judicial question, to be passed upon by a
civil court and a civil jury; and this is what I understand to be meant
by the supremacy of the civil over the military power in this country;
concerning which, I believe, some mention was made in the Declara-
tion of Independence.
Now, our friends on the other side will say, that here there is no
statute; and that the rule would be quite different if a statute existed.
What sort of a statute? A statute foreclosing the question of reason-
able necessity for every act that" might be committed under a proclama-
tion of niartial law?
This means, I suppose, that Congress has power to pass a statute,
in time of war, declaring that the whole United States is in a state
of grave, public danger: that in view of such fact, all constitutional
and statutory provisions are suspended for the duration of the war,
and made subject and inferior to martial law, promulgated and ad-
ministered by the army and its tribunals; that no matter what was
done, under such a statute, in any particular case, that case could never
be subjected to scrutiny and review by the civil tribunals, upon the
ground of reasonable necessity. This would be tantamount to estab-
lishing, for the duration of the war, which might be ten or even twenty
years, a mere military despotism.
If that is what is meant by our Constitution, I think we had bet-
ter abolish it altogether, and try to elect more responsible and capable
men to a supreme legislature.
Of course, the illustration is extreme; but the situation would be
just as bad, if the territory affected were the eastern one hundred
miles of our Atlantic seaboard.
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If our friends who speak of the power of Congress to establish
martial law do not mean this, what do they mean? If they simply mean
that Congress may find the fact of actual or threatened invasion, and
proclaim martial law in the territory invaded or threatened, but that
it still remains a judicial question in each instance, whether the, par-
ticular act donc under martail law was done under reasonable appre-
hension of necessity, there is not so much objection to the statement
Unnecessary martial law, under such circumstances, could not exist
very long without deliberately crushing the courts.
The advantage of a Congressional declaration in such a case
would be merely evidentiary; there could be no binding Congressional
determination, in advance, of the necessity of acts, nor could Congress
determine, in advance, the duration of the future necessity.
The power of the President would be even less than that of Con-
gress; because the President cannot legislate at all.
The civil tribunals, in the presence of overwhelming temporary
force, or while the public danger appeared acute, would doubtless be
slow to act; and there may be a question whether honest belief in neces-
sity or reasonable ground for supposing the necessity, be the test of
non-liability. (Moyer vs. Peabody, 212 U. S. 78.)
Entertaining these views, I really cannot understand the claim
that Congress may emancipate itself and those acting under its orders,
from the authority of the Constitution, -by a statute proclaiming mar-
tial law, total or qualified.
I am not unmindful of the period of Reconstruction but that
seems to me a mere anomalous appurtenance of military government.
The true theory of martial law presupposes the temporary death
of civil authorities. It is, in essence, a somewhat enlarged and more
powerful application of the principle of the posse comitatus.
So far as the suspension of the Constitution is concerned by
"Zilitarv government, the Constitution was never intended to follow
the flags of our victorious armies into foreign territory. Such a sus-
pension of the Constitution is not proven by the argument of necessity
based upon wilitari la. The Supreme Court has yet to decide that
such provisions' as those against double punishment, or cruel and un-
usual punishment, are not applicable to the soldier, as such. On the
contrary, the Supreme Court has entertained cases, as involving the
Constitution, where such immunities were invoked. No one has ever
supposed the provisions of the Constitution, relative to the procedure
of Courts, had anything to do with non-judicial bodies.
Turning now to the other phase of necessity, the Supreme Neces-
sity of War, it may be admitted frAnkly, as has been indicated hereto-
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fore, that at the common law a state of war constituted an occasion*
which modified in some respects the ordinary rules of civil life. This
was just as well-known, perhaps better known, to the framers of the
Constitution, than it is to us.
I can find no evidence that they ever contemplated a dictatorship
in America, where the will of the dictator should be the supreme and
only law. They never contemplated a continental state of siege as a
constitutional status in this country.
They undoubtedly intended the war-power to be a very wide one.
They intended to give Congress the power to pass statutes extending
and changing rules of conduct, because of war conditions, and con-
ferring upon public officers (under the war-power) the right to do a
great many things, as against individual rights, which as individuals,
or in the absence of such a statute, they could not do at all.
In passing every statute, under any of its powers, Congress pre-
sumably has in view the necessities of the public.
Whatever may be their opinion as to public necessities, it has
never been supposed that in exercising any other power, Congress was
not restrained by the applicable negations of the Constitution. They
ought to be equally restrained, in the exercise of the war-power.
The theory of unlimited power anywhere was hateful to our fore-
fathers. Doctrinally, the Revolution was a phase of the long fight
against prerogative. It is well-known that many of the states were
opposed ,to the Constitution, unless it should be amended. Un-
doubtedly, amendments and original Constitution should be read to-
gether as one instrument; but the Supreme Court has repeatedly held
that where there is any necessary conflict, the amendments, being later
laws, should control. They qualified the whole existing Constitution,
and every pait thereof; and it seems difficult to maintain that, prima
facie, at least, they do not qualify the war-power.
It seems to me plain, beyond all controversy, that no fundamental
alterations of the structure of our federal government were ever con-
templated upon any occasion, save by the process of amendment. I
cannot believe that it was intended to vest Congress with the power to
pass a law creating an actual, or effective, dictatorship, and providing
that the President should have and exercise, during the term of the
war, sale and absolute legislative power. Neither in peace nor war
can the President be given power to pass laws. The most that he, or
any other executive officer, can be given in this regard, is power to
find the facts upon which the existing law operates, or is to operate,
and to frame administrative regulations for the orderly and conven-
ient execution of the.existing law. Congress could not pass a law
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abrogating the Courts for the term of the war and erecting them-
selves, or their appointees, into the only national tribunals. Congress
could not pass a law doing away with elections for President and Sen-
ators and providing that the present incumbents should hold their seats
so long as the war should last. I cannot imagine the validity of a law
enacted by Congress abolishing during the war the veto power of the
President. It could not pass a law providing that duties, imposts and
excises should not exist in one state and be piled mountain high in
another. It could not, even to spur their efforts, grant the title of
Duke to its successful generals. It could not lay taxes or duties on
articles exported from a state.
These things seem to me so fundamentally a part of our govern-
mental structure, as to be intended to be beyond the power of con-
gressional change under any excuse or emergency whatsoever. In
the same fashion I cannot imagine the validity of a war measure which
would violate fundamental notions of equality before the law, such as
a draft law conscripting only red-headed men. Nevertheless, we have
certain enthusiastic patriots among us, upon whom I have tried out
some of the foregoing questions, and who have assured me that, in
case of necessity, all these things undoubtedly could be done.
If the war-power be limited by such plain provisions as those
respecting the election of Senators, or the levying of direct taxes, or
the definition of treason, it ought to be limited by every other plain
provision. So far as this country itself is concerned, we have yet to
establish a distinction between essential and non-essential provisions
of the Constitution.
I am aware that some of the advocates of an unlimited war-power
cite decisions of the Supreme Court, as sustaining their theory.
The chief authority relied on is Miller vs. U. S. (11 Wall. 268.)
One act of Congress provided for the seizure and confiscation by
proceedings it, rei, of property used or intended to be used, to
promote the rebellion. Upon proof of such unlawful destination or
use, the property itself was regarded as an enemy. Another statute
provided for the seizure and confiscation of all property, no matter
what its use or destination, belonging to enemies.
Both statutes were sustained, as a legitimate exercise of the war
power, against the objection that they violated the provisions for in-
dictment and jury trial for crime and for due process of law.
The Supreme Court said:
"But if the assumption of the plaintiff in error is not well made;
if the statutes were not enacted under the municipal power of Congress
to legislate for the punishment of crimes against the sovereignty of the
Washington University Open Scholarship
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW.
United States; if, onx the contrary, they are an exercise of the war-pow-
ers of the government, it is clear they are not affected by th erestrictions
imposed by the fifth and sixth amendments. * * -* The question, there-
fore, is whether the action of Congress was a legitimate exercise of the
war-power. The Constitution confers upon Congress, expressly, power
to make war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules
concerning captures on land and water. Upon the exercise of these
powers no restrictions are imposed. The power to make war * * *
includes the right to seize and confiscate all property of an enemy
and to dispose of it, at the will of the captor. This is, and always
has been, an undoubtedly belligerent right. * * * The confiscation
is not because of crime, but because of the relation of the property
to the opposing belligerent." * * *
To infer from this decision, and the facts to which its language
is applicable, that the United States may treat its own citizens pre-
cisely like belligerents: that as against its own citizens the government
is absolutely unfettered, in the passage of any law referable to the
war-power, the Constitution to the contrary notwithstanding: is to
surpass my wildest notions of expansive interpretation.
As a matter of fact, there is no decision of the Supreme Court
known to me, which fairly holds that, under the aegis- of the war-
power, Congress may invade any provision of the Constitution.
The true rule is, that the Constitution binds in war, as well as
in peace.,
Nevertheless, there is very great difficulty in dealing with the
interpretation of some provisions in the amendments. Where a pro-
vision is plain and categorical, obvious in meaning, there can be no
difficulty. Where the provision has a historical reference and signifi-
cance or is expressed ii vague or common-law terms, reference must
be had, as a matter of interpretation, to the history which brought
the provision into existence, and to its historical understanding. When
we have ascertained its historical meaning, as applied to a particular
situation, we must at all times, in Congress and elsewhere, give to the
principle its full effect under a like or analogous situation.
Such provisions as those relating to freedom of speech, unreason-
able search and seizure, deprivation of life, liberty or property, without
due process of law, double jeopardy, and confrontation by witnesses,
"were not intended to lay down any novel principles of govern-
ment, but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities
which we had inherited from our English ancestors, and which
had, from time immemorial, been subject to certain well recog-
nized exceptions arising from the necessities of the case. In
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incorporating these principles into the fundamental law, there
was no intention of disregarding the exceptions which continued
to be ,ecognized as if they had been formally expressed."
(Robertson vs. Baldwin, 165 U. S., L. c. 281.)
The right of free speech was always understood, for example,
to be subject to the implied exception that no man should have the
right with impunity to preach blasphemy, or incite others to the com-
mission of crime. As a matter of fact, some twelve years ago, the
Supreme Court even expressed the opinion that
"the main purpose of such constitutional provisions is 'to pre-
vent all such previous restraints upon publications as had been
practiced by other governments' and they do not prevent the
subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to
public welfare." (Patterson vs. Colorado, 205 U. S., 1. c. 462.)
The only difference that war could make, would be the temporary
enlargement of the power of Congress over that portion of the public
welfare which has direct relation to the raising of armies and the
conduct of war.
A compulsory censorship in advance is invalid, in war as in peace.
Due process of law is a very vague term which the Courts have
never exactly defined. As applied to legislative acts, it probably
always involves the idea of distributive justice-fair equality of treat-
ment between persons standing in the same general relation. It would
prevent the confiscation by the legislature of vested property; but it
leaves open a wide field of regulation, short of confiscation; the limits
of which are bounded in a general way by consideration of public
health, safety and welfare. The effect of war would be to temporarily
enlarge the field of Congress, by including within its regulatory power,
for public safety, all property having reasonably direct relationship
to war necessities.
The right to life and liberty, under the due process of law clause,
was impliedly subject to the historical right of the State to call upon
every man to join the armed forces of the nation to repel an enemy.
It has been suggested that it is within the power of Congress, in
time of war, to compulsorily mobilize every citizen, and compel him
to devote his time and labor to particular industries, with a fixed, or
without any, compensation. Laws relating to idleness and vagrancy,
and to compulsory work on public roads, have been cited in this con-
nection, My own conviction is against the existence of such a war-
poA\er, under our system.
Undoubtedly the making of contracts plainly contrary to public
,afety or necessity, such as trading or commercial intercourse with
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the enemy may be restrained and prevented even though such inter-
course be carried on through neutral countries.
The scope of the power of eminent domain possessed by the
federal government is greatly enlarged, because the government during
the war has power to acquire all property necessary to carry that war
to a successful conclusion. Of course compensation must be made
for every taking, as that word is interpreted; but the compensation
need not be in advance.
A full discussion of all the Amendments is beyond our time, and
I have said enough to indicate my views.
The difficulty with some of the vaguer ones is, as you have per-
ceived, that in a state of war, the scope of public necessity is very
greatly enlarged; and there is, in that sense, merit in the arguments
made with reference to necessity, as understood at the common-law,
and as it ought to be applied to analogous situations.
In what cases, under the Amendments, ought general language
to be restricted in interpretation, by the implied public necessity of
war? This is the problem before the courts; and it is a most difficult
and delicate problem.
In any event, let us not be too prompt to toss away the Constitu-
tion. It has guided our faltering steps, when the storm was wilder
and more turbulent than it is today. Let us resolve to win, to be sure;
but not to win, by ruthlessly sacrificing those limitations upon the
awful power of government, which we were the first to raise in the
name of liberty. Let us use the concededly great national powers, with
which we were wisely provided, for such a season; but let us not
destroy, or impair, under any specious plea of temporary necessity,
the greatest heritage of our fathers.
CHARLES P. WILLIAMS.
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